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∗ 
Abstract 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union is one of the most controversial and divisive topics 
the EU faces. Both EU governments and citizens are deeply divided on whether Turkey should 
become a member or not. This paper takes an in-depth look at European citizens’ attitudes 
towards Turkey’s accession to the EU and explains which elements are key in determining 
support for or opposition to Turkish membership. We use new data, derived from the new 
questions measuring citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey that have recently been introduced in 
Eurobarometer questionnaires. We prove that views for and against Turkish membership are 
multidimensional and that citizens use different arguments for both positions. In particular, we 
show that the likelihood of supporting or opposing Turkey’s membership depends on whether 
citizens adopt a perspective that is utilitarian (resting on costs and benefits), identity-based 
(founded on Turkey being part of Europe) or post-national (linked to the view of a rights-based 
EU emphasising democracy and human rights). The main findings are as follows: first, support 
for Turkey’s membership is mostly based on post-national arguments; second, opposition to 
Turkey’s accession is mainly connected with identity-related arguments; and third, instrumental 
reasons (costs/benefits) play a less relevant role. Turkey’s future membership in the EU, we 
conclude, will thus not be won or lost at the public opinion level on the material plane 
(costs/benefits) but on the relative weight of post-national visions of the EU vis-à-vis more 
essentialist visions of Europe. The key to Turkish EU membership, we suggest, may well lie in 
the way accession is argued and justified, and not wholly in the way it is negotiated. 
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EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION 
AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION 
MAKING SENSE OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
ANTONIA M. RUIZ-JIMENEZ AND JOSE I. TORREBLANCA 
Introduction 
Ensuring popular support for further integration has become one of the biggest challenges 
facing the European Union. Growing levels of Euroscepticism and the increasing mobilisation 
of opposition since the Maastricht Treaty signify the end of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ 
that characterised public attitudes throughout earlier decades of integration (Franklin, Marsh & 
McLaren, 1994; Sitter, 2001). Yet the problem of popular consent is multifaceted and complex. 
Patterns of support for EU institutions, enlargement and deepening vary extensively across 
member states. European integration interacts with national political, economic and social 
settings, producing diverse combinations of incentives, expectations and fears. A better 
understanding of the dynamics of public opinion and its impact on politics and policy-making in 
the EU is thus crucial if the Union’s current dilemmas are to be solved.  
The power of public opinion has been dramatically demonstrated by a number of recent 
referenda on EU issues, many of which have produced popular vetoes to elite-crafted integration 
plans, including the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty. Support for enlargement also began to drop 
substantially in 2004, as the accession of 10 new member states became imminent, and further 
enlargement of the Union has since been amply rejected by citizens in a large number of 
countries. But whereas opposition to further enlargement has been confined to a few of the older 
member states, which had also been opposed to the 2004 enlargement, European public opinion 
is overwhelmingly negative regarding the specific accession of Turkey. 
On 17 December 2004, the European Council took the historic decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey. In May/June 2005, French and Dutch citizens voted ‘no’ in the 
referenda on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. In the debate that followed, both media 
and political discourses often cited opposition to enlargement in general (and Turkey in 
particular) as a fundamental reason behind the ‘nays’ to the Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, 
on 17 June 2005, the European Council confirmed its decision to start accession negotiations 
and, after intense debates and much polemic, these formally began on 3 October 2005.  
Despite conventional wisdom about enlargement featuring in the referenda campaigns in France 
(the ‘Polish plumber’ debate) and the Netherlands (coinciding with the national debate on Islam 
and the integration of Muslims following film-maker Theo Van Gogh’s murder), available 
empirical data shows that negative considerations about enlargement did not play a direct role in 
turning citizens against the Constitutional Treaty. In France for example, only 6% of those who 
voted ‘no’ spontaneously cited Turkey as a reason for voting against the Constitutional Treaty 
and only 3% cited “opposition to further enlargement”. And in the Netherlands, 6% mentioned 
“opposition to further enlargement” when they were asked to explain their negative vote and 3% 
argued that they did not want Turkey to become an EU member state.
1 
                                                 
1 See the special Flash Eurobarometer poll conducted two days after the referenda in France and the 
Netherlands (Eurobarometer 171, 2005, and Eurobarometer 127, 2005, respectively, pp. 19 and 15). The 
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The absence of a direct link between the French and Dutch ‘nays’ to the Constitutional Treaty 
and Turkish accession does not conceal, however, the dominant negative mood existing among 
EU founding member states when it comes to support for enlargement. Europeans show little 
enthusiasm for enlargement in general, and for Turkey’s accession in particular. Positive views 
on the 2004 enlargement or future enlargement rounds are a scarce commodity across the EU. 
European citizens are fairly divided when it comes to endorsing the accession of the former 
Yugoslavian states, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Macedonia. But when it 
comes to Turkey, its accession shows the poorest support indicators (only matched by Albania). 
Furthermore, owing to the fact that citizens of the new member states (NMS) predominantly 
favour future enlargements, the 2004 enlargement has generally had a positive impact on the 
levels of support for the future accession of countries in south-east Europe, yet assent for 
Turkish accession has not benefited from this effect. As a consequence, a split has appeared 
when it comes to support for future accessions, with Turkey being located at the most negative 
end of the spectrum on future enlargement. 
What are the reasons for the extremely low levels of support for the prospect of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU? Media and political discourses tend to point at different factors. 
Sometimes, they cite religious or cultural elements (having to do with Christian values, the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy, etc.). On other occasions, they concentrate on 
demographic factors (either difficulties of accommodating a country as large as Turkey in the 
EU’s institutions or fears of immigration stemming from Turkey’s booming population). Often, 
too, we hear arguments framed in economic terms (stressing how the EU’s common structural 
and agricultural policies would collapse should a country as poor as Turkey get in). Frequently, 
we also hear arguments dealing with security and stability (either in favour of or against 
Turkey’s membership). Lastly, some argue that further political integration along federalist lines 
would be impossible if the EU overstretches to Turkey, just to mention a few of the most 
common arguments.  
Can we make sense of this variety of arguments? Do they point to a coherent set of values, 
preferences and visions concerning the European integration process? We think they do, and 
that it is possible to organise them into three sets of approaches, which in turn give rise to three 
different visions of Europe. As we show, support for or opposition to Turkish membership 
among European citizens is both highly consistent and, at the same time, deeply connected with 
preferences concerning the European integration process. 
Three approaches to people’s beliefs concerning Turkey 
In order to address people’s beliefs concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU, we first adopt a 
threefold analytical distinction between ‘utilitarian’, ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ arguments and then 
derive a testable hypothesis. These dimensions grossly refer to three sets of beliefs and attitudes 
towards the EU and its future evolution. The first refers to a “utility-based” agreement, the 
second to a “value-based” community and the third to a “rights-based” post-national union 
(Sjursen, 2007, pp. 2-11). 
‘Utilitarians’ conceive the EU pragmatically, as a problem-solving entity to which they lend 
their support depending on a cost-benefit analysis: the more they benefit or expect to benefit 
from EU policies in economic, political or security terms, the more they support it and vice 
                                                                                                                                               
surveys show that in both countries the ‘no’ votes had more to do with domestic socio-economic issues 
than with identity questions or enlargement policies. See also the excellent study on this topic by G. 
Ricard-Nihoul (2005). EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 3 
 
versa. Therefore, decisions on enlargement would be assessed in relation to whether the 
accession of new members would expand the wealth or security base of the EU. 
According to the second view of the EU (‘value-based’), the EU would be a geographically 
delimited entity, with a strong sense of common identity, history, culture and traditions. For 
those who share this view, support for the EU would be a function of the perceived congruence 
of EU policies and activities with the set of values they believe are constitutive of Europe in 
terms of a community (a common history, geography and a set of values – whether Christian or 
secular – forming the ‘European way of life’). It follows that decisions on enlargement would 
be based on kinship or ‘we feelings’ and the political discourse about enlargement would be 
predominantly moral: the more a candidate is like the member states in terms of geography, 
culture, history, etc., the more likely its application would be supported and vice versa. 
Finally, according to the third vision, European integration would or should rest on a set of 
universal principles and values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Should 
the EU fully develop in that direction, we would characterise it as a ‘post-national’ or ‘civic’ 
Union. Dealing with enlargement, those who hold such beliefs would support enlargement 
processes to the extent that they believed the applicants shared those values, regardless of a high 
degree of cultural differences and traditions. 
Applied to Turkey, each of these visions could lead us to ask different questions. For example, 
those holding pragmatic views would tend to engage in a debate about costs and benefits. 
Would the foreign policy and security gains outweigh the economic and budgetary costs of 
accession? Would Turkey’s accession collapse EU labour markets or help compensate the 
impact of an ageing population and declining birth rates across Europe? Following this logic, 
the fact that a majority of Europeans oppose Turkey’s accession would mean that a majority of 
Europeans holds that the benefits of its membership do not outweigh the costs or, more simply, 
that Europeans do not agree on whether accession would be too costly in economic or security 
terms. 
But what if support or opposition had nothing to do with costs and benefits? What if Europeans 
were to oppose Turkey’s accession for cultural, historical and geographical reasons even if from 
an economic or security point of view, the EU would benefit from its accession? Or, 
alternatively, what if owing to feelings of shared culture, history and identity, Europeans were 
to support Turkey’s membership despite believing that it would be costly in economic or 
security terms? Clearly, the political picture would be much different. Those who considered 
Turkey to be part of Europe, both geographically and culturally, would be in favour whereas 
those reluctant to identify themselves with Turkey’s geography, history and culture would be 
most reticent to admit it into the EU. 
Finally, let us suppose that support for or opposition to Turkish membership was based not on 
values or on pragmatic considerations, but had to do with the shared principles on which the EU 
stands, such as democracy or human rights. We would then expect Europeans to act on grounds 
of fairness, i.e. even if they did not identify with Turkish culture, history or geography, they 
would support the right of a fully democratic and human rights-compliant Turkey to become a 
member of the EU. In other words, to the extent that Turkey meets both the requisites of TEU 
Arts. 49 and 6.1 on the principles and values on which the Union is based and the Copenhagen 
criteria specifying the accession conditions, it should be accepted as a member state.  
Having briefly summarised the three possible approaches to what the Union is, or should be, let 
us see which sorts of operational hypotheses we could derive. 
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Utilitarian hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis is ‘instrumental support’. The conception of citizens’ support being based 
on instrumental considerations (a rational calculus of costs and benefits) has been widely 
applied to public assent for the EU or European integration,
2 but also to the explanation of 
member states’ support for enlargement.
3 
Following this approach, we may posit that enlargement has costs and benefits, and that 
whenever citizens perceive that the costs will outweigh the benefits, they will oppose it and vice 
versa. Needless to say, costs may vary widely in terms of either the level (European, national, 
regional or personal) or the dimension (economic, political, security or institutional). Also, we 
should not forget that the subjective dimension of cost perceptions might be as important as the 
objective one.
4 Accordingly, citizens support enlargement if and when they perceive the benefits 
to be larger than the costs – that is, enlargement can be legitimised by achieving an output that 
can be seen as an efficient solution to given interests and preferences.  
Our first hypothesis (instrumental support) thus reads the more that Turkish accession is 
considered beneficial, the higher the support will be for accession and, conversely, the more 
costly accession is perceived, the higher the opposition will be to enlargement (H1). 
Using Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 64.2, 2005) we check whether EU citizens see 
advantages in Turkey’s membership and test the extent to which those who see these benefits 
are more inclined to endorse it than citizens who do not see advantages in Turkey’s accession. 
We should find that citizens who think that the benefits outweigh the costs support Turkey’s 
membership to a larger extent (and alternatively those who see disadvantages favour its joining 
to a lesser extent). If the instrumental dimension has a positive impact on support for Turkey’s 
membership, then such support would only improve if the benefits of accession were to become 
more evident. Also, we check whether the relevance of this dimension is homogeneous across 
EU member states, along with its impact on support for Turkey’s membership. Crucially, if 
perceptions of the costs/benefits were not homogeneous among citizens in all member states, 
reaching a decision on Turkey that satisfies all the member states would be almost impossible.  
Identitarian hypotheses 
However much the capacity to deliver policies that satisfy citizens’ preferences is an important 
dimension of legitimacy and support (‘output legitimacy’), people may consider legitimate 
decisions they do not directly benefit from or of which they do not actually approve just because 
they are adopted by a community to which they feel they belong. At the national level, ‘my 
country right or wrong’ is a typical expression of identity-based support. At the European level, 
the feeling of belonging to a political community is also a key factor in explaining support for 
the EU.
5 Empirical data shows that those citizens who feel European also have a higher 
                                                 
2 See Gabel (1998), Eichenberg & Dalton (1993), Gabel & Palmer (1995), Kaltenthaler & Anderson 
(2001), Olsen (1996) and Sánchez-Cuenca (2000). 
3  See Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003), Piedrafita & Torreblanca (2005), pp. 32-33 and Sjursen (2002 and 
2004). 
4 See for example the striking contrast between the official evaluations of the 2004 enlargement costs 
(which unanimously conclude that the benefits have clearly outweighed the costs), and dominant public 
perception, which is much more negative – e.g. European Commission (2006a and 2006b) and Centre for 
European Reform (2006). 
5 See Beetham & Lord (1998), Díez-Medrano (2003), Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) and Ruiz-Jiménez et 
al. (2004). EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 5 
 
probability of supporting the EU (van der Veen, 2002). Therefore, although instrumental 
considerations are crucial when analysing citizens’ support for the European integration process, 
identification with Europe is an equally important source of approval.  
This line of reasoning might be plausibly applied to enlargement. From this point of view, 
enlargement would be endorsed if the candidate countries were thought to belong to ‘our 
community’, to be like ‘us’ or to share ‘our values’. The idea that actors’ preferences are 
contextual or endogenous – that is, derived from the identity of the community to which they 
belong – rather than instrumental or exogenous has been applied to the explanation of EU 
member states’ support for enlargement by historical as well as sociological institutionalism 
approaches. Sjursen (2002 and 2004) has argued that citizens support enlargement if and when 
fellow citizens from accession countries are considered from a perspective of kinship – i.e. if 
citizens from newer and older member states share common references about what is considered 
appropriate given the conception of what Europe and the EU represents.  
Thus, in some situations, rather than evaluating the material costs/benefits of each possible 
course of action, actors tend to examine what the “appropriate” behaviour would be, taking into 
account the dominant values of the group to which they belong (March & Olsen 1989). Using 
this argument, Friis (1998) has explained how the European Council changed its position 
concerning the selection of candidates for accession negotiations. Schimmelfenning (2001) has 
also used it to show how EU member states were “rhetorically entrapped” into accepting an 
enlargement process that they were not happy about. Lundgren (2006) has drawn upon this 
argument to explain differences in support for Turkish and Romanian membership in the EU, 
and Sjursen & Riddervold (2006) have cited it to explain Danish support for the accession of the 
Baltic candidates. Piedrafita (2006) has argued that Spain supported eastern enlargement despite 
its likely negative impact on Spanish interests owing to the perception that it had a moral duty to 
do so. Just as the Community extended to Spain in the 1980s in order to bring it back into 
Europe, Spanish policy-makers argued, Spain fully understood that it was now the turn of 
Central and Eastern European people to return to Europe. Spain could hence debate the 
modalities and conditions of the 2004 enlargement process, but its reading of (a shared) 
European history and values framed its attitudes towards enlargement not only at the elite level, 
but also at the citizens’ level, situating Spanish public opinion among the top supporters of the 
2004 enlargement. 
We may then elaborate a second hypothesis concerning assent for enlargement: identitarian 
support. Accordingly, the more that European citizens believe Turkey is part of Europe (in 
geographical, historical and cultural terms), the more they will support Turkish accession and 
vice versa (H2).  
Eurobarometer data allows us to test whether Turkey is perceived to be part of Europe. We 
expect those who see Turkey as part of Europe to be more supportive of membership than those 
who see it as separate. Here, it is also possible that citizens in different countries have different 
understandings about the extent to which Turkey belongs to Europe. We later explore these 
national divergences and assess the various effects of this identity dimension on support for 
Turkey’s membership on a country-by-country basis.  
Post-national hypotheses 
According to a third possible view of the integration process, the EU would be conceived as a 
rights-based, post-national Union founded on universal principles such as democracy and 
human rights and governed by the rule of law, rather than on traditional ‘national’ values such 
as language, ethnic group, religion and culture (Chryssochoou, 2001; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000).  6 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Research has shown that those citizens who fear losing national sovereignty within the EU 
(those who have not developed post-national identities) tend to support the integration process 
to a lower extent (Christin & Trechsel, 2002; Carey, 2002). At the same time, scholars have 
argued that the development of post-national identities may facilitate and increase support for 
the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p. 2). Similarly, when it comes to enlargement, we may argue 
(Sjursen, 2002 and 2006) that those conceiving the EU in post-national ways, i.e. as a rights-
based Union, may be more likely to support enlargement processes. Citizens’ support for 
enlargement may therefore stem from recognition of universal standards of justice and 
principles that can be recognised as ‘just’ by all parties (such as respect for human rights or 
democracy).  
Thus, in order to decide whether a country could become a member of the EU, we would look at 
the principles governing accession, not at ‘we feelings’ or shared understandings of culture or 
history. These principles are clear. As TEU Art. 49 establishes, “any European State which 
respects the principles set out in Art. 6.1 may apply to become a member of the Union”, and as 
Art. 6.1 affirms, “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States”. Complementing these, the Copenhagen conditions, set out by the European 
Council in 1993, demand that candidates meet four criteria:  
the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy and 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union…[and] 
the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.
6 
Therefore, whether the candidate country is Turkey, Norway or Switzerland it should not make 
much difference. We would simply expect citizens and European institutions to apply these 
principles in a transparent, non-discriminatory manner: those who meet the criteria should be let 
in and those who do not should not (no matter the balance of costs and benefits, and no matter 
the high or low intensity of kinship feelings).  
We may then formulate our third hypothesis (post-national support) as follows: the more 
importance citizens assign to the set of shared principles on which the Union is based, and 
which conform to the enlargement acquis, the more likely their level of support for or opposition 
to Turkish membership will depend on whether they think Turkey meets or is in the position to 
meet these criteria (H3). 
Regarding this dimension, Eurobarometer data allows us to test if citizens are still attached to 
their own cultural values or rather do cherish post-national ones. We expect the former to 
support Turkey’s membership to a lesser extent than the latter. As above, we check the 
relevance of the post-national dimension for each member state and look for differences in 
support for Turkey’s membership. If the post-national dimension has a positive impact on assent 
for Turkey’s accession, then public opinion would improve as traditional national (ethno-
cultural) identities weakened. Yet if post-national attitudes were not homogeneous among 
citizens in all member states, i.e. if national (ethno-cultural) identities remain strong in some of 
them, then the probability of ensuring support based on this dimension would be quite low. 
 
                                                 
6 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 21-22 June, 
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Debating Turkey: Relevant dimensions of public support 
According to Eurobarometer surveys, citizens’ support for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not 
only low, but also shrinking. This is the result of a dual process: whereas accession supporters 
have remained stable since 2000 (in the range of 29-33%), contesters have steadily risen. As 
Figure 1 shows, the consequence is that ‘net’ support for Turkish accession has visibly 
deteriorated.
7 Whereas in autumn 2001, Eurobarometer 56.2 reported opposition to Turkey’s 
membership to be at 46% among the EU-15 member states, this percentage rose to 52% in 
spring 2005 (Eurobarometer 63) and to a further 57% in autumn 2005 (Eurobarometer 64). 
Significantly, this increase does not reflect a shift in support, but the fact that a good number of 
the ‘don’t know’ respondents have lately joined the opposition camp.  
Figure 1. Evolution of ‘net’ support for Turkey’s membership among the EU-15 member states 
(supporters minus contesters, mean for the EU-15) 
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
EB54.1(2000) EB56.2(2001) EB57.1(2002) EB58.1(2002) EB64.2(2005)
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Eurobarometer data. 
As shown in Table 1, opposition to Turkey’s membership is not homogeneous among countries. 
It is much higher among the old EU-15 member states than it is among the 10 NMS (NMS-10). 
But even among the older member states, there are substantial differences: the countries with 
the higher percentages of opposition are Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Greece, France and 
Finland. Opposition to Turkey’s membership in these countries is furthermore a long-lasting 
characteristic of public opinion (see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Support for enlargement figures are very often presented in absolute terms, which we think may be 
misleading. As shown in Figure 1, we use a measure of ‘net’ support, which combines supporters minus 
contesters. Values close to zero imply that public opinion is divided on the matter, while negative values 
imply that contesters outnumber supporters. 8 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Table 1. Net support for Turkey’s membership of the EU by country (supporters minus 
contesters)  
 For Against Net  support 
EU-25 31 55 -24 
EU-15 29 57 -28 
NMS-10 38 44 -6 
Sweden 48 41 7 
Spain 40 33 7 
Poland 42 37 5 
Portugal 40 38 2 
Malta 39 40 -1 
Hungary 41 43 -2 
United Kingdom  38 42 -4 
Slovenia 49 55 -6 
Ireland 33 40 -7 
Netherlands 41 52 -11 
Latvia 31 51 -20 
Lithuania 27 50 -23 
Belgium 36 60 -24 
Estonia 27 53 -26 
Denmark 33 59 -26 
Czech Republic  30 57 -27 
Slovakia 28 56 -28 
Italy 27 57 -30 
Finland 31 64 -33 
France 21 68 -47 
Greece 29 79 -50 
Germany 21 74 -53 
Luxembourg 19 74 -55 
Cyprus 16 80 -64 
Austria 11 80 -69 
Note: The difference between the percentages for and against is those persons 
who did not answer or did not know. 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
 
Comparing among candidate countries, Figure 2 shows that net support for Turkey’s accession 
among the EU-25 member states is –24, the lowest of all the candidates. Moreover, Turkey is 
the only candidate country upon which the 2004 accession of the NMS-10 has had a negative 
effect in terms of public opinion. Although net support for any of the possible future member 
states has increased since 2004 (mainly because the new member states are more supportive of 
further enlargement of the Union), Turkey has been the exception to this rule. 
 EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 9 
 
Figure 2. Net support for future member states (supporters minus contesters, EU-15 and EU-25) 
-24
-17
1
11
16
50
64
65
-3
-1
-5
- 4 0 - 2 00 2 04 06 08 0
Turkey
Albania
Yugoslavia/Servia Montenegro
Bosnia and Herzegovina
FYROM
Romania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Iceland
Switzerland
Norway
EU15(2000-2002) EU25(2005)
 
Notes: Mean net support for the EU-15 is an average taking into account EU-15 net support for each country in 
Eurobarometer surveys 54.1 (2000), 56.2 (2001), 57.1 (2002) and 58.1 (2002). EU-25 net support is derived 
from Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) data. 
Given the weak and eroding support for Turkey’s membership, the European Commission has 
recently introduced a detailed set of questions in the Eurobarometer survey regarding the 
reasons EU citizens may support or reject its accession to the EU. Understanding these reasons 
can help the Commission to address EU citizens in terms that are relevant and meaningful. 
Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) posed the question below. 
QA45. For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, 
tend to disagree or totally disagree: 
-  Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography [geography] 
-  Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history [history] 
-  Turkey’s accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region [security] 10 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
-  Turkey’s accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European 
and Muslim values [comprehension]
8 
-  The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant 
to allow for this accession [cultural differences] 
-  Turkey’s accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population 
[rejuvenation] 
-  Turkey’s joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the 
EU [immigration] 
-  To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human 
Rights [human rights]
9 
-  To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of 
its economy [economy]. 
Some of the items in question A45 can be easily matched with the hypotheses formulated in the 
preceding section. As such, ‘security’, ‘rejuvenation’ and ‘economy’ can be positively related to 
the instrumental understanding of Turkey’s membership (H1), while ‘immigration’ will be 
negatively related. As the correlation among these items is statistically significant, they have 
been included within a single scale that we use for further analysis, thus summarising the 
information.
10  
If attitudes towards Turkey are based on feelings of identity, we expect higher percentages of 
support among those who think that Turkey belongs to Europe because of its geography and its 
history than among citizens who do not share this view (H2). As the correlation among these 
items is statistically significant, they also have been included within a single scale for further 
analysis and summary.
11 
Finally, if attitudes towards Turkey are grounded on the post-national understanding of Turkey 
and the EU as a community sharing universal values, we expect ‘comprehension’ and ‘human 
rights’ to be positively correlated with support for Turkey’s membership, and ‘cultural 
differences’ to be negatively correlated (H3). Among these three items, however, the view on 
                                                 
8 We cannot but criticise the dichotomy between “Muslim” and “European” values introduced in the 
fourth item because it implicitly equals European and Christian values and excludes the possibility of 
combining Muslim and European values. It would be interesting to know whether this dichotomy was 
chosen on purpose or if it is proof of poor drafting and lack of efficient supervision mechanisms. 
9 This response and the subsequent response category differ in significant ways from the rest. First, they 
include a clear temporal frame in their formulation; second, they include conditional clauses for 
membership instead of foreseeable consequences of membership; third, the conditions included are highly 
desirable social ends. As a result of these particularities, these two categories of responses do not really 
offer much information about citizens’ beliefs and attitudes regarding the extent to which Turkey 
respects, will respect, or is able to either respect human rights or improve its economy. 
10 The alpha test of reliability is not very high, however (0.422). The economy is the aspect with the lower 
correlations, but we have kept it within the scale because a significant improvement in alpha reliability 
does not result from deleting any of the items. For the elaboration of the scale, we recoded the factor of 
immigration in a reverse order to indicate increasingly positive attitudes as with all the other items 
included in the scale. We argue that the items included in the scale meet theoretical and logic criteria and 
thus the reliability is stronger than the alpha test or reliability indicates. A factor analysis has not been 
helpful because it discriminates only between generally positive and negative attitudes towards Turkey’s 
accession. 
11 The alpha test of reliability is 0.696; no significant improvement results from deleting any of the 
elements from the scale. EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 11 
 
human rights is not correlated with comprehension and cultural differences. Therefore, the scale 
measuring identity has included only the last two items (comprehension and cultural 
differences).
12  
It is worth noting that the importance of each of these dimensions varies among countries (see 
Table A2 in Appendix A). At the EU-25 level, we find the identity dimension to be the most 
important one, with an average mean of 3.1 on a 1–5 scale; it is followed by the instrumental 
dimension (2.9) and the post-national one (2.7). This finding means that judgements about 
Turkey, and hence levels of support for its accession to the EU, are more likely to be based on 
elements connected with culture, history and geography than with costs/benefits or universal 
principles such as democracy and human rights.  
Nevertheless, behind the aggregate picture at the EU-25 level, significant differences exist. In 
particular, the identity dimension is below this average in Cyprus (2.0), Greece (2.2), France 
(2.7), West Germany (2.8), Austria (2.8), Denmark (2.9), the Netherlands (2.9), Belgium (3.0) 
and Luxembourg (3.0). The instrumental dimension is below the EU average in Cyprus (2.6), 
Greece (2.6), Austria (2.7), West Germany (2.8), France (2.8) the Slovak Republic (2.8) and the 
Czech Republic (2.8). The post-national dimension is also below the EU average in Austria 
(2.0), Greece (2.2), Luxembourg (2.3), Cyprus (2.4), West Germany (2.4) and France (2.5).  
The fact that the subset of countries in which citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey are 
predominantly negative are also those in which the three dimensions are below the EU average 
means that negative attitudes do not have a clear identity, instrumental or post-national 
component that can be easily isolated from the others. It suggests that citizens’ latent negative 
attitudes towards Turkey’s membership are manifested in negative assessments about accession 
consequences. 
It is also important to highlight that in none of the countries is the post-national attitudinal 
dimension more important than the identity or the instrumental dimension. In Cyprus, Greece, 
France, West Germany, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands the instrumental dimension is 
the most important one in defining citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey’s membership; while in 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, East Germany, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Northern Ireland, Finland, the Slovak Republic, Ireland, Sweden, Hungary and Poland the 
identity dimension is the most important one. In Great Britain, Portugal and Spain, the identity 
and instrumental dimensions have similar importance, both being above the post-national one. 
A preliminary analysis using these three dimensions shows that all the dimensions are correlated 
with public assent for Turkey’s membership (Table 2). Yet a post-national understanding of the 
Union as a community based on universal rights (H3) shows a stronger correlation with support 
for Turkey’s membership than the instrumental understanding of advantages to be derived from 
accession (H1) or the feeling that Turkey belongs to Europe (H2). Among the three dimensions, 
the last one exhibits the weakest correlation with endorsement of Turkey’s membership. Thus, 
the fact that the least-important attitudinal dimension among EU citizens is the one in which 
                                                 
12 The alpha test of reliability is only -0.110 for the scale, including the three items. If the aspect of human 
rights is excluded, the alpha test of reliability including comprehension and cultural differences is -0.658; 
no significant improvement results from deleting any of the elements from the scale. For the elaboration 
of the scale, we recoded cultural differences in a reverse order to indicate increasingly positive attitudes 
as with all the other items included in the scale. We have already commented on the particularities of 
responses on the categories of human rights and the economy. Owing to their specific features, these two 
categories tend to load together in exploratory factor analysis, independent of the number of dimensions 
considered. In fact, the alpha test of reliability between economy and human rights results in a figure of 
0.708. 12 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
correlation with public support for Turkey’s accession is strongest offers us a first hint about 
why public support is so low.  
Table 2. Correlation between support for Turkey’s membership and attitudinal dimensions 
towards Turkey’s membership
† 
  Support for Turkey’s 
membership 
Post-national 
attitudes 
Instrumental 
attitudes 
Identity 
attitudes 
Pearson’s 
correlation  1 .611(**)  .515(**)  .430(**) 
Sig. (bilateral)  –  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Support for 
Turkey’s 
membership 
N 21,315  21,315  21,315  21,315 
** Correlation is statistically significant at the .001 level (bilateral).
 
† Support for membership is recoded as a dichotomous variable. Attitudinal dimensions are additive scales (1–5). 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
In other words, the more the identity dimension figures in public debate and attitudes towards 
Turkey, the more probable it is that support will be low. Conversely, the more public debate and 
attitudes towards Turkey are based on the shared principles on which the Union is founded as 
expressed in TEU Art. 6.1, the more likely it is that support for accession will be high. 
Therefore, the more citizens’ cultural identities and attachments prevail, leading to an 
understanding of Europe as a community of cultural (and Christian?) values incompatible with 
Muslim ones, the less likely it is that support for Turkey’s membership will predominate. 
If we use contingency tables to explore the relation between support for Turkey and individual 
items (Table 3 and Appendix B), we see that those who think that Turkey belongs to Europe 
owing to its geography or its history (H2) have an 85% probability of supporting Turkey’s 
membership. This probability is 35 points higher than that for those who do not think that 
Turkey belongs to Europe.  
The likelihood that those citizens who share the opinion that Turkey’s membership will improve 
security in the area (H1) would also be those supporting Turkey’s accession is 97%, 44 points 
higher than that for those who do not share this view. Citizens who think Turkey’s membership 
will rejuvenate the EU’s ageing population would endorse it with a probability of 85%, while 
among those who fear increasing immigration, the probability of favouring Turkey’s 
membership is only 36%, 16 points lower than that among citizens who do not fear 
immigration. By contrast, evaluations of the Turkish economy, i.e. the wealth differential 
between the EU and Turkey, are not relevant (i.e. not statistically significant).  
Table 3. Probabilities of supporting Turkey’s accession depending on attitudes towards 
Turkey’s membership 
 Odds  ratio Probability 
Geography 5.94  85%  (+35%) 
History 5.5  85%  (+35%) 
Security 14.8  97%  (+44%) 
Comprehension 14.7  97%  (+44%) 
Immigration 0.57  36%  (-14%) 
Rejuvenation 5.7  85%  (+35) 
Cultural differences  0.14  12% (-36%) 
Human rights  2.47  70% (+20) 
Economy ns  ns 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 13 
 
Finally, citizens who think Turkey’s membership will favour mutual comprehension between 
Europe and Islam are 97% likely to support it, 44 points higher than that for those who do not 
share this opinion. Conversely, among those who think the cultural differences are just too large 
to allow for Turkey’s membership, the probability of supporting it is only 12%, or 36 points 
lower than that among citizens who do not hold this view. The likelihood that citizens who think 
Turkey must respect human rights before entering the Union are also those who would support 
membership is 70%, or 20 points higher than that among those who do not consider this aspect 
important. 
To understand the differences in support for Turkey’s membership, we start by exploring the 
varying degrees of importance attached to these dimensions in each country. As shown in Table 
A1 (see Appendix A), the identity dimension is the most crucial and is also the one that differs 
the most among countries, with divergences as much as 1.5 points (on a 1–5 scale) in the degree 
of importance. Among those countries/regions in which the identity dimension is more 
significant, we find Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Ireland, the Slovak Republic and Finland. At the 
other extreme, we find Cyprus, Greece, France, West Germany, Austria and Denmark (see 
Figure 3).  
The second most important dimension is the instrumental one, which is similarly relevant for all 
member states, with small differences (0.5 points) in the degree of significance among 
individual countries/regions. Among those that attach more importance to this dimension, we 
find Sweden, Northern Ireland, Denmark, Poland, Ireland and Spain; at the other extreme are 
Cyprus, Austria, Greece, the Slovak Republic, East Germany and the Czech Republic (see 
Figure 4).  
Finally, we find that the post-national dimension is the least important one in the attitudes of 
citizens towards Turkey’s accession, although in the case of this dimension we are able to 
discriminate among countries, with differences of 1 point between the extremes (on a 1–5 
scale). Among those countries/regions that attribute more importance to this post-national 
dimension are Northern Ireland, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain; at 
the other extreme are Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, West Germany, Cyprus and Estonia (see 
Figure 5). 14 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Figure 3. Mean importance of the identity dimension by country 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure 4. Mean importance of the instrumental dimension by country 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure 5. Mean importance of the post-national dimension by country 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Looking in detail at the percentages of people who hold different attitudes towards Turkey, we 
see that at the EU-25 level (see Figure 6 and Table 4; see also Appendix C for the figure 
representing individual countries), there is a positive consensus about the perception that this 
country belongs to Europe because of its geography. Public opinion is divided, however, on the 
consideration of Turkey being part of Europe by virtue of its history. In 10 of the 
countries/regions, the negative perceptions are predominant (Belgium, Denmark, West 
Germany, East Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Cyprus and the Czech 
Republic). In eight areas, the opinion that Turkey belongs to Europe also owing to its history is 
held by the majority (Spain, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Northern Ireland, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic). In another eight countries, public opinion is fairly split 
between those who think that Turkey is part of Europe because of its history and those who do 
not share this perception (Finland, Italy, Portugal, Great Britain, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 
Slovenia). 
Figure 6. Net agreement on each aspect of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (EU-25) 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
As regards the aspects related to the instrumental dimension, a majority of EU citizens do not 
believe that Turkey’s membership will enhance security in the area or rejuvenate the EU’s 
ageing population. Yet on the former issue, at the individual country/regional level citizens are 
divided about the impact of Turkey’s membership on security. This is the case in Denmark, 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain and Estonia. Only in Sweden, Northern 
Ireland and Poland are the percentages of those who hold this opinion larger than those who do 
not agree with this interpretation.  
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Table 4. Net agreement on each aspect of attitude towards Turkey’s membership, by country 
   Geography  History  Security  Comprehension 
Cultural 
differences  Rejuvenation Immigration Human  rights  Economy 
Belgium  14 -14 -29  -16  26 -30 38 94 84 
Denmark 12  -30  -6  -11  26  2  50  96  78 
West  Germany  4  -28 -38  -12  50 -32 54 88 78 
East  Germany  29 -20 -34  -24  32 -40 60 86 78 
Greece 17  -74  -38  -54  54 -50 66 92 88 
Spain  26 13 -4  8  22 20 58 82 76 
Finland  32  8  -28  -4  23 -34 66 92 84 
France  8  -26 -26  -24  26 -32 42 92 74 
Ireland 46  28  -12  6  38  -6  58  94  84 
Italy  20  0  -8  -18  29 -38 26 66 66 
Luxembourg  22 -22 -44  -30  52 -52 10 92 78 
Netherlands  20 -32 -8  0  -2 -26 32 94 74 
Austria  6  18 -58  -53  66 -44 62 78 78 
Portugal  30  -4  0  4  26 -12 42 74 68 
Sweden  64  16  34 12 10  -22  38  98  82 
Great Britain  28  -4  0  0  4  -22  36  88  74 
Northern  Ireland  42 34 12  30  -2 14 62 94 82 
Cyprus  29 -76 -30  -32  44 -46 80 32 62 
Czech Republic  32  -10  -24  -24  32 -52 56 88 78 
Estonia  42 14  4  -16  52 -24 76 90 84 
Hungry  52 50 -22  -2  16 -38 46 86 84 
Latvia  30  -6 -18  -28  42 -38 66 84 78 
Lithuania  36  6  -22  -24  49 -36 48 76 76 
Malta  30  6 -12  -8  38 38 44 90 86 
Poland  70  50  18 12 12  -18  62  89  84 
Slovakia  44 14 -30  -28  30 -62 46 82 76 
Slovenia  30  9  -14  -12  16 -24 50 90 86 
EU-25  average  30.2  -3.0 -16.2  -12.9  30.0 -26.1 50.9 85.4 78.5 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 19 
 
There is less division among member states regarding the view that Turkey’s membership will 
not be very important for the rejuvenation of the EU’s population. Europeans are split in West 
Germany and Ireland alone; only in Spain, Northern Ireland and Malta do we find larger 
percentages of those who think that the impact of Turkey’s membership will be positive on this 
issue. Most EU citizens also agree that Turkey’s membership will increase immigration to more 
developed EU countries: the consensus is positive in all countries, only being weaker in 
Luxembourg.  
There are virtually no divisions among member states concerning their understanding that 
Turkey will have to improve its economy substantially before it can join the Union (we have 
already commented on the significance of this aspect). 
Finally, on the indicators of post-national attitudes, Figure 6 shows that the consensus is 
negative regarding the perception that Turkey’s membership will have a positive effect on 
mutual cultural understanding. In fact, most Europeans think that the cultural differences are too 
large to allow for Turkey’s accession. Concerning mutual comprehension, public opinion is 
divided in Spain, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain and Malta; only in 
Sweden and Poland is there a majority of citizens who think that Turkey’s membership will 
have a positive impact on mutual understanding. There are almost no differences among 
national public opinions on their view that the cultural differences are still too large. Only in the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Northern Ireland are citizens split over this topic. There are 
virtually no divisions among member states regarding their understanding that Turkey will have 
to respect human rights before it can join the Union (although again, we must note that there are 
problems with this item in QA45). 
Having examined the different dimensions and the importance given to them across the EU 
member states, we next consider the extent to which these dimensions explain support for 
Turkey’s membership. In other words, which of these dimensions or aspects (or both) are 
relevant for explaining support for Turkey’s membership in each country? 
A logistic regression with these three dimensions as independent variables shows that they are 
quite relevant (Table 5). On average, they explain 58% of the variance in public support for 
Turkey’s enlargement (60% in the EU-15 member states and 52% in the NMS-10). The 
dimensions are also relevant for the explanation of public assent in each individual country, and 
while a little less explicative in the NMS-10, they are still pertinent.  
As the correlation analysis suggests, the post-national dimension is the most important one for 
explaining support for Turkey’s membership, followed by the instrumental one and then the 
identity dimension in last place. Although this sequence is not maintained in all of the countries, 
in almost all of them the identity dimension comes last when attempting to clarify public 
support for membership (the only exception being Denmark). The instrumental dimension is the 
most important one, however, in the following countries: Greece, Spain, Ireland, Austria, 
Portugal, Great Britain, Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (see also 
Table 6). 
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Table 5. Logistic regression: Impact of attitudinal dimensions on support for Turkey’s membership
† 
   EU-25  EU-15  NMS-10  Belgium  Denmark  West 
Germany  
East 
Germany  Greece  Spain 
Post-national  4.024*** 4.126*** 3.649***  3.343*** 5.019***  6.164*** 4.053***  3.173***  3.976*** 
Instrumental  3.284*** 3.289*** 3.801***  2.061*** 1.876***  2.657*** 2.387***  11.663***  6.473*** 
Identity  1.634*** 1.689*** 1.210***  1.854*** 2.294***  1.793*** 1.620*** 1.716**  1.461** 
N 21343  13583  7760  987  945  972  484  998  724 
R2  .586 .597 .523  0.577  0.685 0.664  .630  .633  0.5844 
   Finland  France  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Austria  Portugal  Sweden 
Post-national  3.690***  4.7***  3.322*** 3.981***  4.557***  4.187***  4.077*** 1.673***  3.799*** 
Instrumental  2.066*** 4.185*** 3.765***  2.735*** 2.352***  2.575*** 8.459***  2.895***  2.578*** 
Identity  1.61***  2.206***  1.713*** 1.645***  2.001***  1.774***  2.112*** 1.496***  1.610*** 
N  975 891 730  841 475  968 930  728  918 
R2 0.517  0.66  0.49  0.516  0.585  0.612  0.746  0.231  0.547 
   Great 
Britain 
Northern 
Ireland  Cyprus  Czech 
Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Malta 
Post-national  3.778*** 3.570*** 1.962***  3.485*** 3.045***  2.283  2.857***  2.813***  2.894*** 
Instrumental  4.015***  ns  4.862*** 3.162***  3.007***  3.665***  2.795*** 3.624***  2.614** 
Identity 1.641***  1.474*  ns  1.402***  1.315***  1.373***  1.415***  1.38*  2.199*** 
N  810 217 478  1020 793  823 832  766  382 
R2 0.552  0.269  0.34  0.512  0.465  0.432  0.393  0.432  0.503 
   Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia                   
Post-national  4.729***  3.404***  2.860***                   
Instrumental  4.206***  4.758***  2.937***                   
Identity  ns  1.253*  1.484***                   
N  770  926  970                   
R2  0.555  0.499  0.483                   
† Odds ratios are reported instead of the beta coefficient. The odds ratios are comparable and can be translated into probabilities: (Odds)/(Odds+1). 
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Table 6. Logistic regression: Impact of individual items in QA45 on support for Turkey’s membership
†  
   EU-25  EU-15  NMS-10  Belgium  Denmark  West 
Germany 
East 
Germany  Greece  Spain 
Geography  2.343***  2.462*** 1.450** 3.590*** 3.284***  2.405*  2.518*  2.651**  ns 
History 1.730**  1.657***  1.541***  1.749*  4.800***  2.000*  2.331*  ns  ns 
Security 4.332***  4.604***  3.638***  2.220***  3.783***  3.648***  7.575***  18.987***  7.146*** 
Comprehension  4.188*** 4.281*** 4.111*** 2.290***  9.478***  7.926***  3.267** 5.509***  6.175*** 
Cultural differences  .177***  .168***  .225***  .103***  .095***  .094***  .125***  .195***  .222*** 
Rejuvenation 2.193***  2.304***  2.111***  2.250***  ns  2.852***  ns  4.446***  3.527** 
Immigration .618***  .593***  .641***  ns  .482*  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Human rights  1.201***  ns  1.470*  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Economy 1.025***  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Constant .107***  .101***  .117***  .183***  .021**  .068***  .127***  .044***  .069*** 
N 14799  9726  5073  881  568  800  406  870  382 
R2 0.606  0.615  0.547  0.604  0.752  0.653  0.675  0.692  0.711 
   Finland  France  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Austria  Portugal  Sweden 
Geography  ns  3.940***  4.357** ns  ns 3.426***  ns 1.559*  6.850*** 
History 2.557  2.151*  ns  ns  6.212**  2.298***  13.371**  ns  ns 
Security 2.296***  6.045***  5.088***  4.837***  6.286**  3.476***  8.306***  2.753***  2.396** 
Comprehension  3.302***  4.045*** 3.308** 5.962***  3.993*  3.287*** 7.593**  2.654***  3.528*** 
Cultural differences  .178***  .132***  .140***  .193***  .063***  .170***  .104***  ns  .165*** 
Rejuvenation ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  1.948**  2.693**  1.678*  2.435*** 
Immigration ns  .273***  .265**  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  .504** 
Human rights  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  8.199*  ns  ns 
Economy ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns  10.641*  2.914**  ns 
Constant .130***  .094***  .166*  .095***  ns  .301*  .000***  .150***  ns 
N 829  621  330  596  293  688  761  501  590 
R2 0.49  0.677  0.637  0.528  0.654  0.607  0.762  0.297  0.568 
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Table 6. cont. 
   Great 
Britain 
Northern 
Ireland  Cyprus  Czech 
Republic  Estonia  Hungry  Latvia  Lithuania  Malta 
Geography 2.431*      ns  ns  2.440*  1.923*  ns  ns  3.287* 
History ns      ns  1.943**  ns  ns  1.735*  ns  3.798** 
Security 6.171***      15.793***  3.374***  4.771***  3.433***  ns  4.323***  ns 
Comprehension 3.031**     6.789***  4.352***  2.592**  2.565***  6.541***  6.891***  4.567* 
Cultural differences  .297***     ns  .273***  .114***  .281***  .175***  ns  .238** 
Rejuvenation .650**     ns  2.182**  1.801*  2.271**  2.243**  ns  ns 
Immigration .233***     ns  ns  ns  .551*  ns  ns  .194** 
Human rights  ns     ns  7.455***  ns  ns  ns  4.651*  ns 
Economy ns      ns  ns  ns  4.755**  ns  .168*  ns 
Constant .134***      .001***  .032***  ns  .284**  .233***  .084*  .136* 
N 441  79  386  733  495  563  493  374  157 
R2  0.636      0.551 0.55 0.566 0.432 0.456  0.532  0.628 
   Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia                   
Geography  ns  ns  1.771*                   
History  ns  1.819*  1.912**                   
Security  4.478***  3.380***  2.506***                   
Comprehension  4.436***  5.901***  3.003***                   
Cultural differences  .155***  .561*  .187***                   
Rejuvenation  1.981*  2.577***  2.018**                   
Immigration  ns  .328***  .557*                   
Human rights  ns  2.378*  ns                   
Economy  ns  ns  3.170*                   
Constant  .144**  .112***  .091***                   
N  450  706  766                   
R2  0.585  0.545  0.519                   
† Odds ratios are reported instead of the beta coefficient. The odds ratios are comparable and can be translated into probabilities: (Odds)/(Odds+1). 
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Conclusions 
Having examined the available empirical evidence on attitudes towards Turkey’s membership 
of the EU, we can offer the following conclusions. 
•  First, support for Turkish membership is not only low, it is also declining. Whereas 
accession candidates from the Western Balkans have benefited from increased public 
support for enlargement as a consequence of the 2004 enlargement, Turkey has been an 
exception to this trend. Turkish membership is proving to be the least popular among recent 
EU enlargement processes.  
•  Second, we show that public support for Turkish membership can be understood along three 
different dimensions: instrumental, identitarian and post-national (or civic). In each of these 
dimensions, citizens may find different arguments for being for or against Turkey’s 
accession. We show that the publics in different EU member states and regions mix the 
three dimensions in varying ways. 
•  Third, we find that supporters for Turkish accession are mostly counted among the ranks of 
those having a post-national vision of the EU. Conversely, those against Turkish accession 
are more likely to be so departing from identity-related arguments. We also find that the 
utilitarian dimension is the least important of the three. 
The policy implications of our findings can be summarised as follows: 
•  First, since public support for enlargement is increasingly considered a key variable in 
determining the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, it seems evident that policy-makers need to pay 
more attention not only to the accession negotiations themselves, but also to the elements 
determining public support for or opposition to Turkish accession. 
•  Second, given that public opinion remains structured along national lines, it does not easily 
allow for the emergence of a much-needed EU-wide debate. The debate about Turkey’s 
accession is and will continue to be a constitutive debate about European identity and 
values. Yet the weakness of the European public sphere implies that consensus on Turkey’s 
membership will be difficult to reach. A strategy to ‘Europeanise’ the national debates on 
Turkey’s membership may thus be crucial for both those in favour and those against. But 
because accession will be dealt with by unanimity, and taking into account that negative 
sentiments prevail in a good number of countries, this strategy is more critical for the 
former than for the latter. 
•  Third, since the instrumental dimension is not central to the debate, a strategy highlighting 
the likely benefits of Turkish membership may hardly impress those already against 
Turkey’s accession. With accession lying a decade ahead, the sorts of conclusions we may 
derive about the likely impact of membership on budgets, the movement of people, etc., will 
at best be probabilistic and never conclusive. Therefore, we suggest that those in favour of 
Turkish membership should be more ready to show that there are more reasons to support 
accession despite its likely costs and not merely because of its benefits. 
As has been the case with preceding enlargement rounds, the net balance of membership for 
both the EU and the acceding countries can only be properly assessed 20 years after accession, 
once the full benefits have been realised. Spain is a good case in point (Piedrafita et al., 2006). 
Had the decision on Spanish membership been taken based on the (overwhelmingly negative) 
assessment of the costs, Spain would never have become a member state.  24 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Detailed impact assessments and prospective studies about the likely costs and benefits of 
Turkish membership are of course an essential tool for policy-makers to prepare both parties 
(the EU and Turkey) for accession. Still, as membership will not solely be settled on 
cost/benefit grounds, policy-makers should pay more attention to the way the debate about EU 
values is framed. Thus, those in favour of Turkish accession may do well to devote more time 
and energy to try to frame the debate in post-national terms.  
The more the discourse on Turkey is played along identity lines, as we have argued, the more 
likely it is that support will remain low. Conversely, the more the discussion about Turkey is 
held and justified along post-national arguments, the more likely it is that support will be high. 
Therefore, whether those against Turkish accession tend to frame the debate in terms of 
European identity, those in favour of Turkey’s membership should be more ready to justify their 
position in terms of the European values embodied in TEU Arts. 49 and 6.1, and the need to 
treat accession candidates objectively and according to the same standards. Jon Elster (1991) 
has defined “arguing” as the act of “engaging in communication for the purpose of persuading 
an opponent, i.e. to make [the] other change beliefs about factual or normative matters”. To us, 
it is evident that Turkish membership needs more arguing and maybe a bit less bargaining.  
| 25 
References 
Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998), Legitimacy and the European Union, New York, NY: 
Logman. 
Carey, S. (2002), “Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European 
integration?”, European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 387-413. 
Centre for European Reform (2006), Enlargement Two Years on: Economic Success or Political 
Failure?, Briefing paper for the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Central 
Organization of Industrial Employees in Denmark, Centre for European Reform, London, 
April. 
Christin, T. and A. Trechsel (2002), “Joining the EU? Explaining public opinion in 
Switzerland”, European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 415-43. 
Chryssochoou, D.N. (2001), Towards a civic conception of the European polity, ESRC “One 
Europe or Several?” Programme Working Paper No. 33/01, Economic Social and 
Research Council, London. 
Diez-Medrano, J. (2003), Framing Europe: Attitudes to European integration in Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Eichenberg, R. and R. Dalton (1993), “Europeans and the European Community: The dynamics 
of public support for European integration”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4, 
pp. 507-34. 
Elster, J. (1991), “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée 
Constituante”, Working Paper No. 4, Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern 
Europe, University of Chicago Law School. 
Eriksen, E.O. (2003), “Integration and the quest for consensus: On the micro-foundations of 
supranationalism”, in European governance, deliberation and the quest for 
democratisation, E.O. Eriksen, C. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds), ARENA Report No. 2/03, 
Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State, University of Oslo. 
Eriksen, E.O. and J.E. Fossum (2000), The EU and post-national legitimacy, ARENA Working 
Paper 00/26, Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State, University 
of Oslo. 
European Commission (2006a), Enlargement Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation, 
Occasional Paper No. 24, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Brussels, May.  
–––––––––– (2006b), Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 
2003 Accession Treaty (Period 1 May 2004 – 30 April 2006), Draft, COM(2006), 
IP/06/130, European Commission, Brussels, 8 November. 
Franklin, M., M. Marsh and L. McLaren (1994), “Uncorking the bottle: Popular opposition to 
European unification in the wake of Maastricht”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 455. 
Friis, L. (1998), “‘The End of the Beginning’ of Eastern Enlargement: The Luxembourg 
Summit and Agenda-Setting”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 2, No. 7. 
Gabel, M. (1998), Interest and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion and European 
Union, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Gabel, M. and H.D. Palmer (1995), “Understanding Variation in Public Support for the 
European Integration”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 3-19. 26 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004), “Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on 
European integration?”, Political Science Online, July (retrieved from www.apsanet.org). 
Kaltenthaler, K.C. and C. Anderson (2001), “Europeans and Their Money: Explaining Public 
Support for the European Currency”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 40, 
No. 2, pp. 347-61. 
Lundgren, A. (2002), “The limits of enlargement”, Paper prepared for the ARENA Conference 
on “Democracy and European Governance”, held in Oslo on 4-5 March 2002. 
March, J. and J. P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of 
politics, New York, NY: Free Press. 
Moravcsik, A. and M.A. Vachudova (2003), National interest, state power and the EU 
enlargement, Working Paper No. 97, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Olsen, J.P. (1996), Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics, ARENA Report No. 96/3, 
Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State, University of Oslo, pp. 
245-85. 
Piedrafita, S. and J.I. Torreblanca (2005), “The three logics of EU enlargement: Interest, 
identities and arguments”, Politique Européene, 15, pp. 25-69. 
Piedrafita, S., F. Steinberg and J.I. Torreblanca (2006), Twenty years of Spain’s membership in 
the EU (1986-2006), Elcano Royal Institute for International Affairs, Madrid. 
Ricard-Nihoul, G. (2005), « Le “non” français du 29 mai 2005: comprendre, agir », Etudes et 
Recherches No. 44, Notre Europe, Paris, 18 October. 
Ruiz Jiménez, A., J. Górnial, A. Kosic, P. Kiss and M. Kandulla (2004), “European and national 
identities in the EU’s old and new Member States: Ethnic, civic, instrumental and 
symbolic components”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8, No. 11. 
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000), “The Political Basis of Support for European Integration”, 
European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 147-71. 
Schimmelfenning, F. (2001), “The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the 
Eastern enlargement of the European Union”, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, 
pp. 47-80. 
Sitter, N. (2001), “The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Euro-
scepticism a government-opposition dynamic?”, West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, 
pp. 22-39. 
Sjursen, H. (2004), Enlargement in perspective, ARENA Report 2/05, Proceedings for the 
CIDEL Workshop held in Avila, May 2004, Advanced Research on the Europeanisation 
of the Nation State, University of Oslo. 
–––––––––– (ed.) (2002), Enlargement and the finality of the EU, ARENA Report 7/02, 
Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State, University of Oslo. 
–––––––––– (ed.) (2007), Questioning EU enlargement: Europe in search of identity, 
Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. 
Van der Veen, A.M. (2002), “Determinants of European identity: A preliminary investigation 
using Eurobarometer data” (retrieved from 
http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/vanderveen.html).  
| 27 
Appendix A. Tables 
Table A1. Historical trends: Net support for Turkey’s membership among EU-15 member states 
(supporters minus contesters)  
  
EB 54.1 
(2000)
EB 56.2 
(2001)
EB 57.1 
(2002)
EB 58.1 
(2002) 
EU-15 -18 -12 -16 -17 
Belgium -31 -22 -19 -25 
Denmark -20 -24 -21 -33 
Germany -33 -22 -26 -26 
Greece -41 -39 -49 -49 
Spain 18 16 16 5 
France -41 -41 -45 -41 
Italy -14 -11 -27 -15 
Luxembourg -40 -30 -32 -29 
Netherlands 1 0 -9 -12 
Austria -42 -25 -21 -29 
Portugal 10 20 22 14 
Finland -26 -30 -20 -33 
Sweden -9 2 -10 -10 
United Kingdom  -2 7 1 4 
Sources: Eurobarometer surveys 54.1 (2000), 56.2 (2001), 57.1 (2002) and 58.1 (2002). 
 
Table A2. Mean importance of the post-national, instrumental and identitarian dimensions   
in support for Turkey’s membership, by country (1–5 scale)
† 
   Post-national 
attitudes
Instrumental 
attitudes
Identity 
attitudes 
Cyprus 2.4 2.6 2.0 
Greece 2.2 2.7 2.2 
France 2.5 2.9 2.7 
West Germany  2.4 2.8 2.8 
Austria 2.0 2.7 2.8 
Denmark 2.6 3.1 2.9 
Netherlands 2.9 3.1 2.9 
Belgium 2.6 2.9 3.0 
Luxembourg 2.3 2.9 3.0 
Great Britain  2.9 3.1 3.1 
Italy 2.7 3.0 3.1 
East Germany  2.6 2.8 3.1 
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Table A2. cont. 
Malta 2.7 3.0 3.1 
Portugal 2.9 3.1 3.1 
Latvia 2.5 2.9 3.1 
Czech Republic  2.6 2.8 3.1 
Spain 2.9 3.1 3.1 
Slovenia 2.7 3.0 3.2 
Lithuania 2.6 2.9 3.2 
Estonia 2.5 2.9 3.3 
Northern Ireland  3.1 3.1 3.3 
Finland 2.7 2.9 3.3 
Slovakia 2.6 2.8 3.4 
Ireland 2.9 3.1 3.4 
Sweden 3.1 3.2 3.7 
Hungary 2.8 2.9 3.7 
Poland 3.0 3.1 3.7 
Average mean  2.7 2.9 3.1 
† All differences are statistically significant at the 0.005 level (ANOVA). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Appendix B. Summary of SPSS Outputs 
(Contingency Tables) 
Table B1. Country * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01    
Belgium Count  616 371  987
  % of country  62.4 37.6  100
 Adjusted  residuals  3.5 -3.5  –
Denmark Count  610 336  946
  % of country  64.5 35.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals  4.7 -4.7  –
West Germany  Count  767 197  964
  % of country  79.6 20.4  100
 Adjusted  residuals 14.4 -14.4  –
East Germany  Count  350 139  489
  % of country  71.6 28.4  100
 Adjusted  residuals  6.5 -6.5  –
Greece Count  787 201  988
  % of country  79.7 20.3  100
 Adjusted  residuals 14.6 -14.6  –
Spain Count  331 411  742
  % of country  44.6 55.4  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -7.0 7.0  –
Finland Count  661 316  977
  % of country  67.7 32.3  100
 Adjusted  residuals  6.8 -6.8  –
France Count  681 209  890
  % of country  76.5 23.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals 11.9 -11.9  –
Ireland Count  402 335  737
  % of country  54.5 45.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -1.4 1.4  –
Italy Count  572 270  842
  % of country  67.9 32.1  100
 Adjusted  residuals  6.5 -6.5  –
Luxembourg Count  378 96  474
  % of country  79.7 20.3  100
 Adjusted  residuals 10.1 -10.1  –
Netherlands Count  541 428  969
  % of country  55.8 44.2  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -0.8 0.8  –
Austria Count  813 111  924
  % of country  88.0 12.0  100
 Adjusted  residuals 19.3 -19.3  –
Portugal Count  378 402  780
  % of country  48.5 51.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -4.9 4.9  –30 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Sweden Count  424 494  918
  % of country  46.2 53.8  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -6.8 6.8  –
Great Britain  Count  432 383  815
  % of country  53.0 47.0  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -2.4 2.4  –
Northern Ireland  Count  91 130  221
  % of country  41.2 58.8  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -4.8 4.8  –
Cyprus Count  402 79  481
  % of country  83.6 16.4  100
 Adjusted  residuals 11.9 -11.9  –
Czech Republic  Count  664 350  1.014
  % of country  65.5 34.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals  5.5 -5.5  –
Estonia Count  533 271  804
  % of country  66.3 33.7  100
 Adjusted  residuals  5.4 -5.4  –
Hungary Count  427 409  836
  % of country  51.1 48.9  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -3.6 3.6  –
Latvia Count  525 321  846
  % of country  62.1 37.9  100
 Adjusted  residuals  3.0 -3.0  –
Lithuania Count  511 271  782
  % of country  65.3 34.7  100
 Adjusted  residuals  4.7 -4.7  –
Malta Count  201 195  396
  % of country  50.8 49.2  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -2.6 2.6  –
Poland Count  368 416  784
  % of country  46.9 53.1  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -5.8 5.8  –
Slovakia Count  618 310  928
  % of country  66.6 33.4  100
 Adjusted  residuals  6.0 -6.0  –
Slovenia Count  461 510  971
  % of country  47.5 52.5  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -6.2 6.2  –
X
2 = 36664*** 
Phi = .381*** 
V Cramer = .381*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table B2. Q45_Tk_geography01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01 Total
     01  
Q45_Tk_geography01 0  Count  6,776 1,135  7,911
   %  of  row  85.7 14.3  100
   Adjusted  residuals 51.2 -51.2  –
 1  Count  6,022 5,988  12,010
   %  of  row  50.1 49.9  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -51.2 51.2  –
Total   Count  12,798 7,123  19,921
   %  of  row  64.2 35.8  100
X
2 = 2618.271*** 
Phi = .363*** 
V Cramer = .363*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B3. Q45_Tk_history01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_history01 0  Count  8,474 1,872  10,346
   %  of  row  81.9 18.1  100
   Adjusted  residuals 53.5 -53.5  –
 1  Count  4,064 4,945  9,009
   %  of  row  45.1 5.9  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -53.5 53.5  –
Total   Count  12,538 6,817  19,365
   %  of  row  64.8 35.2  100
X
2 = 2857.673*** 
Phi = .384*** 
V Cramer = .384*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B4. Q45_Tk_security01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
 Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
 01  
Q45_Tk_security01 0  Count  9,735 1,340  11,075
 %  of  row  87.9 12.1  100
 Adjusted  residuals 78.4 -78.4  –
1 Count  2,639 5,366  8,005
 %  of  row  33.0 67.0  100
 Adjusted  residuals  -78.4 78.4  –
Total   Count  12,374 6,706  19,080
 %  of  row  64.9 35.1  100
X
2 = 6151.610*** 
Phi = .568*** 
V Cramer = .568*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 32 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Table B5. Q45_Tk_comprehension01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_comprehension01 0  Count  9,587 1,237  10,824
   %  of  row  88.6 11.4  100
   Adjusted  residuals 78.0 -78.0 –
 1  Count  2,924 5,543  8,467
   %  of  row  34.5 65.5  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -78.0 78.0  –
Total   Count  12,511 6,780  19,291
   %  of  row  64.9 35.1  100
X
2 = 6086.152*** 
Phi = .562*** 
V Cramer = .562*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B6. Q45_Tk_diff_cult01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
 Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
 01  
Q45_Tk_diff_cult01 0  Count  2,666 4,359  7,025
   %  of  row  38.0 62.0  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -60.9 60.9  –
 1  Count  10,198 2,384  12,582
   %  of  row  81.1 18.9  100
   Adjusted  residuals 60.9 -60.9  –
Total   Count  12,864 6,743  19,607
   %  of  row  65.6 34.4  100
X
2 = 3711.720*** 
Phi = -.435*** 
V Cramer = .435*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B7. Q45_Tk_rejuvenation01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_rejuvenation01 0  Count  9,230 2,282  11,512
   %  of  row  80.2 19.8  100
   Adjusted  residuals 52.6 -52.6  –
 1  Count  2,717 3,812  6,529
   %  of  row  41.6 58.4  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -52.6 52.6  –
Total   Count  11,947 6,094  18,041
   %  of  row  66.2 33.8  100
X
2 = 2769.717*** 
Phi = .392*** 
V Cramer = .392*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION | 33 
 
Table B8. Q45_Tk_immigration01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_immigration01 0  Count  2,924 2,313  5,237
   %  of  row  55.8 44.2  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -16.6 16.6  –
 1  Count  9,797 4,484  14,281
   %  of  row  68.6 31.4  100
   Adjusted  residuals 16.6 -16.6  –
Total   Count  12,721 6,797  19,518
   %  of  row  65.2 34.8  100
X
2 = 275.229*** 
Phi = -.119*** 
V Cramer = .119*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B9. Q45_Tk_human_rights01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_human_rights01 0  Count  1,211 300  1,511
   %  of  row  80.1 19.9  100
   Adjusted  residuals 13.4 -13.4  –
 1  Count  11,737 6,908  18,645
   %  of  row  62.9 37.1  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -13.4 13.4  –
Total   Count  12,948 7,208  20,156
   %  of  row  64.2 35.8  100
X
2 = 179.910*** 
Phi = .094*** 
V Cramer = .094*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table B10. Q45_Tk_economy01 * Q44_member_Turkey01 
   Q44_member_Turkey01  Total
   01  
Q45_Tk_economy01 0  Count  1,539 807  2,346
   %  of  row  65.6 34.4  100
   Adjusted  residuals  1.3 -1.3  –
 1  Count  11,002 6,116  17,118
   %  of  row  64.3 35.7  100
   Adjusted  residuals  -1.3 1.3  –
Total   Count  12,541 6,923  19,464
   %  of  row  64.4 35.6  100
X
2 = 1.591 ns 
Phi = .009 ns 
V Cramer = .009 ns 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Appendix C. Figures 
Figure C1. Net support for Turkey in current member states (supporters minus contesters) 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C2. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in Belgium  
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C3. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in Finland 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C4. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in Denmark 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C5. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in France 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C6. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in West Germany 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C7. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in Ireland 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C8. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in East Germany 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C9. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters 
minus contesters) in Italy 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C10. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Spain 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C11. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Luxembourg 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C12. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Greece 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C13. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in the Netherlands 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C14. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Austria 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C15. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in the Czech Republic 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C16. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Portugal 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C17. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Estonia 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C18. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Sweden 
SWEDEN
-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Geography
History
Security
Comprehension
Cultural differences
Rejuvenation
Immigration
Human Rights
Economy
  
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C19. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Hungary 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C20. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Great Britain 
GREAT BRITAIN
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C21. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Latvia 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C22. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Northern Ireland 
NORTHERN IRELAND
- 4 0 - 2 00 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0
Geography
History
Security
Comprehension
Cultural differences
Rejuvenation
Immigration
Human Rights
Economy
 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C23. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Lithuania 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C24. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Cyprus 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C25. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Malta 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C26. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Poland 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
Figure C27. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Slovakia 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). 
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Figure C28. Net importance of single items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership 
(supporters minus contesters) in Slovenia 
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Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).  
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  About EPIN 
 
 
EPIN is a network of European policy think tanks and institutes. It has more than 25
member think tanks from 21 countries, including most EU member states and candidate 
countries. Over the coming two years, within the framework of the Ratification Monitor 
project, EPIN intends to monitor the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty and 
the debates that will surround it in all of the member states. It will provide 
comprehensive, coherent and easy access for all those interested in the European policy 
debate. Beyond the Constitutional Treaty, EPIN’s network of think tanks will provide 
analysis of all the different national debates, and of the complex political dynamics of the 
pan-European debate.  
 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
•  To promote and develop pan-European debate and understanding on the key 
issues associated with the future of Europe.  
 
•  To promote discussion and understanding of the political dynamics of the different 
national debates, and trans-European comparisons of discourse on EU-related 
issues. 
 
•  To hold meetings in the member states and candidate countries and further 
meetings in Brussels offering different national views of the debate, involving a range 
of different civil society actors as well as policy-makers, analysts and commentators. 
 
•  To develop interaction, contacts and exchange of information and analysis 
across the members of the network. 
 
•  To undertake and encourage joint analysis and to publish joint working papers 
on the key issues of the debate. 
 
•  To promote international communication and dissemination of the network’s 
activities and outputs.  
 
EPIN is coordinated by a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS, Brussels), the Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherche 
Notre Europe (France), the Real Instituto Elcano (Spain), the Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies (SIEPS, Sweden) and the Centre for European Reform (CER, UK).